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NOTES
Statutory and Common Law Considerations in Defining the
Tort Liability of Public Employee Unions to Private Citizens for Damages Inflicted by IDegal Strikes
Despite their nearly universal prohibition, 1 strikes by public em1. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United Steelworkers v.
University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56, 61 (5th Cir. 1979); United Fedn. of Postal Clerks v. Blount,
325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971) (per curiam); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Communications
Workers, [1969-1970) Lab. Cas. (CCR) 67,095 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1969); Fort Smith v. Arkansas
State Council, 245 Ark. 409,433 S.W.2d 153 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 lli.2d 567,
207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 ill. 2d 5447, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974); Anderson Fedn. of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329 (1970), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970); Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d
867 (1968); City of Alcoa v. Electrical Workers Local Union 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476
(1957).
Statutory prohibitions include 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) (Supp. II 1978) (strike by federal
employees is unfair labor practice); 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) (1976) (criminal penalties for strike by
federal employees); ALA. CODE § 11-43-143 (1975) (firefighters); ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200
(1962) (strikes by firefighters, police, correctional, mental institution, and hospital employees
prohibited; limited strike rights granted to other public employees); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962
(West 1971) (firefighters); CAL. GoVT. CODE§§ 3523.5, 3549 (West 1980) (excluding state employees and teachers, respectively, from the right to strike afforded private employees by CAL.
LAB. CODE§ 923 (West 1971)); CoNN. GEN. STAT.§§ 5-279, 7-475, 10-153(e) (1981) (prohibiting strikes by state employees, municipal employees, and teachers, respectively); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 1613(d), tit. 14, § 4011(c), tit. 19, § 1312 (1974) (strikes by transit workers, teachers, and public employees, generally, respectively, prohibited); D.C. CODE ANN. 1-618.5
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 447.SOl(e), 447.505; (West 1977) GA. CODE ANN.§§ 89.1301 (public employees generally), 89.9917 (1980) (criminal liability, for those who incite a strike); HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 89-12 (1976) (nonessential employees in recognized bargaining units may
strike after exhausting statutory impasse procedures); IDAHO CODE § 44-1811 (1949)
(firefighters); IowA CoDE ANN.§ 20-12 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 75-4333(c)(5) (1977);
KY. REv. STAT.§§ 78.470, 345.130 (1977) (police and firefighters respectively); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN.§§ 964(2)(c)(l-3), 979-C(2)(c)(l-3) (1964) MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. (1978) §§ 6-410, 6-513
(teachers); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150 E, §§ 9A, 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); MlcH. COMP.
LAWS § 423.202 (1?70); MINN. STAT. ANN. §179.51 (West 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.530
(1969) (explicitly refusing to grant public employees the right to strike); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 288.230 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 273-A: 13 (1977); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW§ 210 (McKinney 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1.14(1); Omo REv. CoDE. ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1973);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §51-lOl(B) (firefighters and police), tit. 70, § 509.8 (1978) (teachers); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 91-97 (1966) (if strike amounts to a "grave emergency," governor may,
upon report by a special commission, seek ex parte injunction to compel strikers to return to
work); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 28-7-45, 28-9.3-1, 28-9.4-16, 36-11-6 (1!?69) (firefighters, police and
health care providers; teachers; municipal employees; state employees, respectively); S.D.
CoDIFlED LAWS ANN.§ 3-18-10 (1980); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 49-9 (1977) (teachers); TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 83 § 5154(c)(3) (Vernon 1971) (state epiployees, firefighters, police), TEX.
Eouc. CooE ANN. §13.216 (Vernon 1972) (teachers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 903, (state employees strikes allowed unless they occur less than 30 days after fact finder's report or after
arbitration is agreed to, or will endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public); VA. CODE
§ 40.1-55 (1981); WASH. REV. CoDE 41.56.120 (1981); WIB. STAT.§§ 111.70(4)(1), 111.77(1),
lll.89(1) (1974). See also ill. Atty. Gen. Op. No. S-804 at 249 (1974); 75 Ky. Atty. Gen. Op.
126 (1975); 60 Utah Atty. Gen. Op. 003, at 288 (1960).
The !ndiana statute banning strikes was invalidated for unconstitutio~ lack of judicial
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ployees are not uncommon. 2 Ordinarily public employers enforce
this prohibition through court-ordered injunctions3 or employmentrelated sanctions.4 Recently, however, both public employers5 and
private citizens6 have attempted to supplement these enforcement
mechanisms by suing illegally striking unions for damages. The few
courts confronted with such suits have divided on whether to recognize a private cause of action for damages resulting from illegal
strikes by public employees.7
This Note argues that in the absence of any clear indication that
the legislature intended to bar such suits, courts should uphold private actions whenever plaintiffs can establish the elements of a common-law tort. Part I briefly outlines the various theories supporting
the view that public sector collective bargaining statutes preempt prireview of administrative discretion, Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp., 266 Ind. 491,365 N.E.2d 752 (1977), and has not been reenacted. Strikes
remain illegal in Indiana, however, by force of Anderson Fedn. of Teachers, 252 Ind. 558, 254
· N.E.2d 329 (1970).
2. On the frequency of public employee strikes see Cole, Public Employee Strikes - Tlte
£aw and Possible Altematives, ll CUM. L. REv. 315, 316 n.5 (1980).
3. ''That right of public employees to strike has usually been tested by an application for
an injunction forbidding the strike. The right of the governmental body to this relief has been
uniformly upheld. It has been put on various grounds: public policy; interference with governmental function; illegal discrimination against the right of any citizen to apply for government employment (where the union sought a closed shop)." Norwalk Teachers' Assn, v. Board
of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,274, 83 A.2d 482,484 (1951). Thus, although many statutory schemes
specifically include the injunction remedy, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200(b); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.507(2) (West 1977) IowA CODE ANN. § 20-12 (West 1978), such relief remains
available at common law in the absence of expressed statutory authorization. Holland School
Dist v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
4. E.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 89-1303 (1978); lowA CODE ANN.§ 20-12(4) (West 1978); Va.
Code§ 40.1-55 (1981)
· 5. Pasadena Unified School Dist v. Pasadena Fedn. of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977); Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 252
N.W.2d 818 (1977); City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Department Store Union, 197980 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37,157 (W. Va. 1980).
6. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973); Caso v. Gotbaum,
67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d (1971), revd, 38 A.D. 2d 955, 321 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972); Burns
Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct.
1981); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, SI Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Fulenwider v. Fire.fighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) f 36,956
(Tenn. App. June 2, 1980); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots, West Coast & Pac. Region Inland Div., Branch G, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282
(1979) (en bane).
7. The Supreme Courts of Michigan, Washington, and West Virginia have held that private plaintiffs cannot prevail in an action against a public employees' union for damages infilcted by illegal strikes. Appellate courts in New York and Tennessee have held that private
citizens may succeed in actions for such strike-infilcted damages. See Lamphere Schools v.
Lamphere Fedn. of Schools, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977); Burns Jackson Miller
Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d ~95 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Fulenwider
v. Fire.fighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) f 36,956 (Tenn. App.
June 2, 1980); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, West
Coast & Pac. Region Inland Div., Branch G, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 (1979) (en bane);
City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Dept Store Union, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas.
(CCH) f 37,157 (W. Va. Oct 21, 1980).
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vate actions. The analysis is necessarily general, 8 but Part I concludes that in most cases neither the language and structure of the
applicable statute nor an analogy to federal labor law will resolve the
preemption question. Part II, therefore, looks to the policies that animate no-strike provisions and argues that private actions generally
further those policies. Finally, Part III advances nuisance and negligence as valid theories for imposing and defining union liability in
tort to private plaintiffs injured by illegal strikes.

I.

PREEMPTION OF PRNATE ACTIONS

The statutory regimes governing employment relations in the
public sector fall primarily into three categories. Many states recognize the right of public employees to bargain collectively under a
comprehensive statutory and administrative scheme but prohibit
strikes by public employees.9 Other states simply outlaw strikes,
without recognizing a right to bargain collectively. 10 And a few
8. It is not possible within the scope of this Note to identify, much less analyze, the various
approaches state courts might take toward the preemption issue. State courts are bound, as a
general matter, to follow rules of statutory construction laid down by the legislature. See Hall,
Strict or Liberal Construction ofPenal Statutes, 48 HAR.v. L. REv. 748, 754-56 (1935). In the
absence of legislative guidance, courts will presumably rely on common-law construction canons, see note 18 infra, a course that this Note argues will often yield no more thanpost-ltoc
rationalization for results that should be arrived at only through the sort of policy analysis
advanced in Part Il.
9. Comprehensive collective bargaining schemes typically include recognition of the employees' right to organize and of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith; provisions for
bargaining unit determination and exclusive representation; definition of prohibited labor
practices; an administrative agency to implement the statutory system, process grievances, and
act as fact finder; judicial review of the administrative agency; provisions outlawing strikes
under at least some circumstances; and remedies for violations of the statute. Such schemes
include: 5
§§ 7101-7135 (1976); Al.AsKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-23.40.260 (1962); CAL.
GOVT. CODE§§ 3500-3548.8 (West 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5270-5280, 7-467-7-477, 10153(a)-I0-153(m) (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 tit. 19, §§ 1301-1312; HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 89-1-30; IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1801-44-1811 (1977) (firefighters); loWA CODE
ANN.§§ 20.1-20.29 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 72-5413-72-5431 (1980); §§ 75-4321-754335; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.26 §§ 961-974, 979-979(N); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN.§§ 6-401-6411 (1981) (teachers); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, §§ 1-15 (Michie/Law. Co-op) (1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 179.50-179.58 (West 1976); MoNT. CODE ANN.§§ 39-31-101-39-31-409
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.010-288.280 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273-A:1-273A:16 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 34:13A-l-34:13A-13 (West 1965); N.Y. JUD. LAW §751 (McKinney 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 51-101-51-113, tit. 70, §§ 509.1-509.10 (West 1978)
(police and firefighters, and teachers, respectively); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 243.650-243.782 (1979);
R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 28-9.1-1-28-9.1-16 (firefighters), 28-9.3-1-28-9.3-16 (teachers), 28-9.4-1-289.4-19 (municipal employees), 36-11-1-36-11-6 (1969) (state employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 3-18-1-3-18-17 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5501-49-5516 (1977) {teachers); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 901-1007 (1972) (state employees), tit. 16, §§ 1981-2010 (1974) (teachers),
tit. 21, §§ 1721-1735 (1978) (municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE§§ 41.56.010-41.56.960
(public employees generally), 41.59.010-41.59.950 (1981) (teachers); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 111.70-111.97 (West 1974) (municipal and state employees).
·
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 89.1301 (public employees generally); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 4117.01-4117.05 (Page 1980); Tux. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154(c)(3) (Vernon 1971)
(prohibiting public sector collective bargaining and voiding contracts so arrived at, as well as
prohibiting strikes); VA. CODE§§ 40.1-55-40.1-57.l (1950).

u.s.c.
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states have no statutory provisions whatsoever regulating the right to
strike or recognizing the right to bargain. 11
The preemption question poses the most difficulty in jurisdictions
operating under the first regime. 12 Where the legislature has both
flatly prohibited strikes and established a comprehensive scheme to
govern public sector labor relations, courts must first consider
whether recognizing private actions would contravene the legislature's intent. Specifically, courts might examine the language and
structure of the statute to determine whether private actions comport
with the statutory scheme. Courts also might look to federal labor
law and reason by analogy from the federal approach to preemption.
A. Statutory Language as Indicative of an Intention lo Preempt

Whether public employee statutes preempt private damage actions is not likely to be resolved by standard techniques of statutory
construction. Ordinarily, courts look first to statutory language in
their attempts to discern legislative intent. 13 But the typical public
employee statute 14 does not mention private actions, and little extrinsic evidence bears on the legislative intent to preempt, permit, or
imply private actions. 15
This is not surprising, for these statutes were enacted well before
the fairly recent recognition of the possibility of private actions. 16
II. Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
West Virginia, Wyoming. Now that Indiana's state employee collective bargaining statute has
been declared unconstitutional, see note I supra, it also belongs in this group.
12. Where no statute governs public sector labor relations, no statutory language need be
interpreted and only common law policies require consideration. Where the only relevant
statute is a simple strike ban, the policies favoring collective bargaining do not partake of
legislative significance.
13. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
14. See note 9 supra. The Florida statute, however, provides for actions against illegally
striking unions, brought by the public employer. FLA STAT. § 447.507(4) (1979). The Iowa
code provides that "(e]ach of the remedies and penalties provided by this section is separate
and several, and is in addition to any other legal or equitable remedy or penalty." lowA CODB
ANN.§ 20-12(6) (West 1978). Even such oblique references to the possibility of other, nonstatutory remedies rarely appear in public sector collective bargaining statutes.
15. Many states, of course, do not compile legislative histories even today. See C. NUTTINY & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 560 (1978) ("[F]ormal committee reports are not usually customary in many state legislatures."). A review of the
legislative history pertaining to the Michigan statute suggests that the legislature did not consider the preemption issue. See MicH. HousB JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1947) 790, 864, 1003,
lll5, ll58, ll79, 1617-18, 1666-67; MICH. SEN. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1947) 974, 1176-77, 203,
1243-44, 1268, 1336-38; MICH. HOUSE JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1965) 980, 1332, 1777-81, 1860-66,
2329-30, 2481-82, 2579-80, 2963; MICH. SEN. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess. (1965) 1261, 1482-84, 162931.
16. The earliest reported decision of a
involving a damage action against a public
employee union for an illegal strike is apparently Jamur Prod. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501,273
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Defendants' counsel in that case later wrote: "Our careful
search, as well as that of experienced and resourceful counsel for the plaintiffs in this group of
cases, has not revealed any judicial precedent dealing with private damage actions against
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Statutory silence, therefore, probably indicates only that the legislature did not consider this issue. 17 In this statutory vacuum, the canons of construction provide a rationalization for any result, but a
principled justification for none. 18 In the absence of an express saving or exclusivity provision, 19 courts generally cannot conclude with
unions conducting public employees' strikes." Waldman, Damage Actions and Other Remedies
in the Public E111JJloyee Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 259, 260 (1968). The Jamur court dismissed the action. The first reported decision to uphold union liability appears to be Caso v.
Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1971), revd on other grounds, 38
A.D.2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972). Consequently, legislatures had no reason to consider
private damage action until 1971, long after most of the collective bargaining statutes appeared
in the books.
17. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631,636 (5th Cir. 1979). (''It would be sophistry for us to
divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not consider.") John Gray's words apply quite
clearly here:
Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was to discover what the
meaning of the Legislature really was. But when a Legislature has had a real intention,
one way or another, on a point, 1t is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises to
what its intention was. If that were all that a judge had to do with a statute, interpretation, instead of being one of the most difficult of a judge's duties, would be extremely
easy. The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature
had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute never occurred to
it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on
a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point
not present to its mind, if the point had been present.
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 165 (1909).
18. The canons amount to no more than a dialectical system, each tenet of which opposes
another, equally plausible, venerable, and epigrammatic, but calling for a completely opposite
result. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 V ANO. L. R.Ev. 395, 401-06 (1950). The points of
this dialectic applicable to legislatively intended preemption of private remedies for public
remedies for public employee strikes are (1) that statutes should not be interpreted to derogate
the common law without a clear expression oflegislative intent, and (2) that a comprehensive
system of regulation itself indicates legislative intent to completely occupy the field and displace the common law. See, e.g., California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D.
Cal. 1969) ("The mere fact that Congress codifies a cause of action and provides a penalty
creates no presumption of the nonexistence of similar rights at common law . . ."); Terry v.
Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 Ariz. 548, 552 617 P.2d 56, 60 (Ct. App. 1980) ("Statutes are not to
be construed as effecting any change in the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated"); Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1979) ("statutes will not be construed as
taking away common law rights . . . unless that result is imperatively required"). Examples
of comprehensive regulatory schemes displacing the common law include Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952) (regulation of shipping); Fulton Cty. Fiscal Court v. Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry., 202 Ky. 846, 261 S.W. 617 (1924) (regulation of railroad crossings); Boston Ice
Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 77 N.H. 6, 86 A. 356 (1913) (liability rules for fires caused by railroad
operations).
Insofar as this war between the maxims requires technical resolution, state public employee
labor statutes are generally no more comprehensive than the federal legislation from which
they evolved. Given that the Supreme Court has found room within the federal labor statutes
for state court tort claims based on illegal labor practices, in spite of the added obstacle posed
by the Supremacy Clause, these statutes should not preempt private remedies by virtue of their
"comprehensiveness." See note 32 in.fra.
19. A saving clause "is said to preserve from destruction certain rights, remedies or privileges which would otherwise be destroyed by the general enactment." IA C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.22 (4th ed. 1972). An exclusivity provision is intended
to make clear that a statute "creates a new right or imposes a new duty or liability, unknown to
the common law, and gives a remedy'' that is exclusive. BLAcK.'s LAW DICTIONARY 674 (4th

ed.~
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certainty that the legislature would have either rejected or welcomed
private actions.

B. Statutory Structure as Indicative of an Intention To Preempt
Because statutory language alone cannot resolve the issue, courts
must look elsewhere to infer what the legislature would have intended had it considered private actions. Specifically, a court might
attempt to determine whether private actions are consistent with the
statutorily established enforcement scheme.20 This approach suggests two arguments supporting the view that private actions have
been preempted, but both yield at best indeterminate, and at worst
misguided, results.
The first argument would focus on the fact that many public employee statutes set out in comprehensive detail the enforcement options available to the state for violations of a no-strike clause. A
court might conclude that private actions would have been expressly
mentioned had the legislature intended to allow them. 21 But it seems
equally reasonable to assume that state legislatures act with full
awareness that extant or evolving common law actions might complement statutory remedies. 22 Courts should, of course, fashion
common law to minimize its interference with legislation, but they
should not refuse to consider a common law claim merely because it
arises out of conduct that is also statutorily regulated. The growing
codification of American law would leave little to the judiciary if
deference to the legislature demanded abdication of a court's common law function in all cases arguably affected by a statute.23
The second argument in support of the preemption conclusion
also relies on the statutory specification of enforcement procedures.
A court might reason that because public employee statutes provide
for extraordinary enforcement procedures - procedures not gener20. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHJP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 45 (1969) ("[L]egislative activity, administrative rulemaking ••• the making of written constitutions have brought into being in highly developed form [the method of] searching • • • the
written text for its reasoning in application to the presented case.").
21. Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Schools, 400 Mich. 104, 112-13, 252 N.W.2d
818, 821-22 (1977).
22. Several state legislatures currently examine decisions rendered by their courts in an
attempt to modify legislation where necessary. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 24.065(a)(l) - (3)
(1979 Supp.) (requiring State Legislative Council to "annually examine administrative regulations, published opinions of state and federal courts • • • to determine whether or not • • • the
courts and agencies are properly implementing legislative purposes . • • the opinions or regulations indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes."); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 4.311-4.327 (Supp.
1979) (requiring Law Revision Commission to "examine the common law and statutes of the
state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in
the law.•• .''). See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OP STATUTES 29-30
(1982).
23. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 4-5; Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Stalulory Interpretation in the SUJ7reme Court, 95 HAR.v. L. REv. 892, 912-15 (1982).
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ally available as remedies in a civil suit - these provisions somehow
preempt the less drastic remedy of compensatory damages. 24 But
this approach ignores the possibility that the legislature might have
merely reserved the most drastic sanctions for its exclusive use just as the legislature often imposes criminal penalties for conduct
that also gives rise to private damage actions.25 A court could reasonably hold that a statute does not authorize private actions to enforce its own provision26 without concluding that the legislature
intended to bar all private remedies, particularly when the private
remedy is compensatory rather than punitive.

C. Analogy to Federal Labor Law
Since the language and structure of the relevant state statutes do
not answer the preemption question, a court might seek guidance in
federal labor law. The strength of the analogy to federal labor law
will, of course, vary from state to state, depending on the statutory
and administrative scheme in question and the state interests perceived to be at stake. This approach has much to commend it; after
all, many public employee statutes were patterned after the National
Labor Relations Act27 (NLRA). As a result, state courts often accord
federal labor law decisions persuasive weight when interpreting their
own statutes.28 Analogy to federal labor law, however, cannot dictate a result one way or the other on the preemption question. Gen24. The Lamphere Schools court's language at one point suggests this approach. 400 Mich.
104, 114 n.3. (''There was no precedent for the proposed action under the common law at the
time the [public employee statute] was enacted . . . . Nor may such a cause be implied from
the [statute]. Furthermore, the statutory remedy • •. is adequate.") (emphasis added).
25. For example, most states treat the creation of a public nuisance as a crime, although
civil actions will still lie for private parties seeking redress for special damages. See note 117
supra. See generally Pound, Introduction to F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxiii (1927)
("In the beginnings of law, tort and crime are undifferentiated.").
26. The Supreme Court of Washington has implied that the omission from the state's public sector labor relations statute of a provision parallel to § 303(b) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976), indicates that the legislature chose to exclude damage
remedies from the statutory regime. See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 773, 600 P.2d 1282, 1288-89 (1979) (en bane). However,
§ 303 applies only to the recognition of a damage remedy for violation of certain substantive
sections of the LMRA itself. Consequently, omission of a parallel section does not indicate an
intention to preclude common-law damage remedies predicated on duties independent of the
statute.
27. See, e.g., Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 119-20.
Compare statutes set out in note 9 supra, with 20 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp.
1979).
The right to organize, the duty to bargain, and the primary implementation authority of an
administrative agency all derive from the NLRA.
28. See, e.g., 400 Mich. at 119-24; Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters,
Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d at 773; 600 P.2d 1288-89; 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 320 (4th ed. 1972) ("State and federal statutes may be in pari materia,
and if so, should be construed together, for it may be presumed that the legislature had in
mind existing federal statutes relating to the same subject matter when enacting the statute
being construed and that affected parties would have their understanding of the state act infiuenced by it since the people of the state are subject thereto.").

m
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erality necessarily limits the analysis presented here, 29 while a
detailed analysis of the state interests that would underlie a court's
decision to dismiss or allow private actions on the basis of analogy to
federal labor law is deferred until Part II. But some of the more
obvious factors that might concern a court analogizing to federal labor law deserve immediate consideration:
At least one court has expressed the fear that allowing private
actions would require the adjudication of ancillary unfair labor
practice charges that would, if substantiated, constitute a defense
against state enforcement of sanctions established under a no-strike
clause. In Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Federation of Schoo!s, 30
the Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that private actions would
contravene earlier decisions vesting exclusive jurisdiction of unfair
labor practice charges in the state's Michigan Employment Relations
Commission.31 While understandable, the court's concern fails to
justify this severe reaction. The same conduct - in this case, a strike
- may give rise to different issues,32 and the court could have concluded that the strike violated common-law duties without deciding
the unfair labor practice issue.33 Union defenses against sanctions
sought by the public employer would not necessarily constitute a defense to the tort claims of private citizens if those claims did not
depend on a violation of the statute.34 The tort theories advocated
29. See note 8 supra.
30. 400 Mich. 104,253 N.W.2d 818 (1977).
31. TheLampltere Scltoo!s court was particularly concerned with unfair labor practice defenses, 400 Mich. at 118-19, 253 N.W.2d at 824-25, but there are any number of other issues
that might be better resolved in an arbitration setting then in court. See generally Van Wezel
Stone, Tlte Postwar Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (19~1).
32. Under federal labor law, for example, conduct allegedly in violation of state law is not
immune from liability merely because the conduct also can be viewed as involving labor relations concerns. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 198 (1978). In Sears a retail store owner attempted to oust pickets
from his property by filing a state-law trespass action. Depending upon its purpose, the picketing might have, but need not have, constituted an unfair labor practice. ("If Sears had filed a
charge, the federal issue would have been whether the picketing had a recognitional or workreassignment objective; decision of that issue would have entailed relatively complex factual
and legal determinations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had
occurred. Conversely, in the state action, Sears only challenged the location of the picketing;
whether the. picketing had an objective proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state
claim.") Correspondingly, a claim that a public employee strike constitutes negligence or a
public nuisance does not depend on violation of the collective bargaining statute, and hence
does not implicate the labor board's primary jurisdiction over statutory unfair labor practices.
33. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 198 (1978).
34. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where areasonable man would take additional precautions."); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821B, Comment d (1965); see City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d
624, 321 N.E.2d 412 (1974) (compliance with environmental regulations does not preclude
liability ~or public nuisance).
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by this Note do not depend on statutory violations.35 Consequently,
solicitude for the primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies assigned to resolve alleged violations of collective bargaining statutes
should not bar claims advanced under these theories.
The unfair labor practice defense issue is but a specific example
of a broader problem that might weigh in favor of preemption.
Under federal labor law, courts regularly defer to the National Labor Relation Board's (NLRB) administrative expertise;36 they rely
on the board's expertise in labor-related matters to justify its exclusive jurisdiction over matters that might otherwise properly be heard
in state or federal forums. 37 A state court might reason that private
actions would strip state agencies analogous to the NLRB of exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes. This is a valid concern: The
administrative expertise that ultimately justifies exclusive agency jurisdiction is less likely to develop if courts regularly bypass the
agency without good reason. 38
Nevertheless, courts should hesitate to assume that the analogy
between the NLRB and state administrative agencies warrants the
same degree of deference to agency expertise that prevails in the federal context. The most obvious difference between the expertise of
federal and state agencies concerns their respective scope. The
NLRB is an extensively staffed, hierarchically organized agency that
handles a nationwide docket of private sector labor disputes. 39 Most
state agencies, by contrast, draw on a far more ~ted stock of
cases.40 It is not unreasonable to suppose that state agencies can
35. See text accompanying notes 113-116 in.fro.
36. See generally Van Wezel Stone, supra note 31. It has been assumed, for example, that
the NLRB is capable of assessing the effect of an employer's speech on employee conduct. See
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 463 U.S. 469,479 (1941) ("[T)he purport of these utterances may be altered by imponderable subtleties at work, which it is not our function to
appraise.").
37. See, e.g., Amalgamated Assn. of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 288
(1974):
,
The rationale for preemption . • . rests in large measure upon our determination that
when it set down a federal labor policy Congress plainly meant to do more than simply
alter the then-prevailing substantive law. It sought as well to restructure fundamentally
the processes for effectuating that policy, deliberately placing the responsibility for applying and developing this comprehensive legal system in the hands of an expert administrative body rather than the federalized judicial system.
(Footnote omitted.)
38. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393 (advancing the view that "incrementalist" policymaking by administrative agencies was dominant
from 1930 through the mid-1960s, agency adjudication and rulemaking reviewed "leniently''
on factual issues).
39. See R. SMITH, L MEruuFrnLo & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 56 (6th ed. 1979) (NLRB disposed of 37,602 complaints in 1977 fiscal year.).
40. By contrast to the annual volume of NLRB dispositions, the Michigan Employment
Relations Commission, for example, issued only 151 decisions in 1980. This figure was derived from the index to its annual volume of decisions. See XV MERC Labor Opinions at 2r6r (1980).
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never develop a level of expertise equivalent to that of the NLRB.
Less persuasive reasons, therefore, might support judicial deference
to administrative expertise in the state context -particularly when a
court faces novel questions of common law. In any event, if exclusive
agency jurisdiction is thought imperative, or if private actions require adjudication of matters properly within the ageny's jurisdiction, courts should simply stay proceedings until the agency reaches
its decision.41 This procedure would preserve whatever administrative expertise the agency has to offer without denying plaintiffs their
common-law rights.
In general, then, neither conventional statutory analysis nor analogies to federal labor law resolve the preemption issue.42 Given that
the legislature had no opportunity to consider private actions when
enacting public sector labor statutes, both the decision that such statutes pre-empt private damage actions and the decision that they do
not risk contravening the rule the legislature would have laid down
had it considered the issue.43 The best course through this statutory
vacuum evaluates private actions in light of the goals of public employee statutes in an effort to further the broader policy purposes
animating this legislation. Federal courts44 pursue this type of analysis whenever they consider whether the NLRA pre-empts a tort
claim arising under state law. State courts should avoid superficial
attempts to resolve the private action question by mechanical application of construction canons or misplaced analogies to federal labor
law.45 An open reliance on policy analysis follows the best commonlaw tradition,46 and possesses the added advantage of apprising the
legislature of the court's concerns.47 Legislatures certainly have the
41. See, e.g., Bechtel Corp. v. Local 215, Laborers' Intl. Union, 544 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.
1976).
42. Since the framers of neither the state, see note 17 supra, nor the federal legislation
considered the propriety of private !ictions, this should not be surprising. The framers of the
federal legislation, involved with conferring the right to strike on private sector workers,
clearly did not contemplate private actions against public employee unions for illegal strikes.
43. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979)
(It would be sophistry for us to divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not consider. Nor would it be permissible for us simply to withhold judgement on the basis that
there is no law to apply. Instead we must attempt, at least in part intuitively, to determine
how we think Congress would have voted had the question been r_aised legislatively.).
44. See, e.g., McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d at 636-37; Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power
Com.mn., 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); In re
Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications and Video-tape Surveillance, 513 F.
Supp. 421, 423 (D. Mass. 1980); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128
(1921) ("Obscurity of statute or of precedent or of customs or of morals, or collision between
some or all of them, may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it
retrospectively in the exercise of a powerftankly legislative in function." (emphasis added); J.
GRAY, supra note 17.
45. See note 32 supra.
46. G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 178-81; B. CARDOZO, supra note 44, at 128.
47. G. CALABRESI, supra note 22, at 29-30.
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authority to revise whatever result a court might reach, and nothing
suggests that they will hesitate to do so when they disagree with a
court's resolution of the private action question. 48

II.

THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE DAMAGE ACTIONS ON THE POLICIES
EMBODIED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STATUTES

A. Policy Interests Underlying Public Employee Statutes
The propriety of recognizing private actions for strike-inflicted
damages depends on a careful weighing of the likelihood that these
actions would further or frustrate important state policies. Because
comprehensive public sector collective bargaining statutes incorporating no-strike provisions reflect a variety of interests,49 a court
faced with deciding whether to allow private actions must consider
how these actions would affect such interests. Accordingly, this Part
seeks to identify these broad interests and to examine how private
actions would affect them.
1. Public Policy of Collective Bargaining Rights

for Public Employees
Public employee statutes reflect concerns that go beyond merely
prohibiting strikes. The policy objectives that forged private sector
labor law also relate to labor relations between governments and
their employees. It has long been recognized that "[t]he claims upon
public policy made by the need for industrial peace, industrial democracy and effective political representation point toward collective
bargaining for public employees." 50 Indeed, collective bargaining
has been viewed as one means of avoiding illegal strikes, precisely
because it serves to improve working conditions and terms of employment and to encourage an ongoing, harmonious relationship between public employers and employees. 51 Appeals to fundamental
48. State legislatures were not reluctant, for example, to reenact their death penalty statutes. See w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (5th ed.
1980).
49. See, e.g., Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 931, 931 (1969)
("One of the major unmet challenges we face is how to prevent strikes by public employees
without denying them the right to organize and bargain collectively."); Comment, Collective
Bargaining/or Public Employees and the Prevention ofStrikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 260, at 260 ("Because of the inherent conflict in legislative goals, it is unclear at the
present time whether the new statutes can achieve both the promotion of fairer employment
contracts than have prevailed in the past and the prevention of all strikes in public employment.") (emphasis in original).
50. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78
YALE LJ. 1107, ms (1969).
51. See, e.g., Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 943, 953-54; Kheel, supra note 49 at 942:
I suggest that reliance on legal prohibitions, penalties, and elaborate third-party recommendations has not worked, and that before we turn in desperation to compulsory thirdparty determination, which cannot serve as a steady diet, we should give bargaining in the
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fairness can also justify collective bargaining: It would be anomalous to deny public employees, who perform essential and often dangerous services in the public interest, a privilege almost universally
granted private sector_ employees.52
This does not mean, however, that public employees ought to
possess the same labor rights and benefits as employees in the private
sector. The concerns that support collective bargaining for public
employees may argue for an approximate balance in the bargaining
power of public employers and public employee unions, 53 but it is by
no means clear that the same balance should prevail in the public
sector and in the private sector, or that only complete incorporation
of private sector labor rights in the public sector can achieve this
balance. The sound policy considerations that underlie the no-strike
provisions in most public employee statutes54 - as well as principled
respect for the sovereign prerogatives of state and local govemments55 - may justify significant differences between the rights of
public and private sector employees. A review of the policies that
support public employee strike bans suggests both that significant
differences between private and public employers justify no-strike
clauses and that correlative differences between private and public
unions diminish any fear that an effective strike ban will destroy collective bargaining.

2. Public Policy Behind the Strike Ban
The theories that strikes by public employees should be outlawed
because they offend the government's sovereignty,56 or because pubpublic sector the same opportunity it has received, with beneficial results, in the private
sector.
52. Edwards, Tlte Emerging ./July To Bargain in tlte Public Sector, 11 MlcH. L. REV. 885
(1973) ("[A) government which imposes upon private employers certain obligations in dealing
with their employees may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants on a
reasonably similar basis modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service.") (quoting 1955 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES 89-90),
53. See, eg., Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 131 ("The
precarious and uneasy balance of labor-management power which exists in the public labor
relations sector could be easily upset [by private damage actions)."); Caso v. District Council
37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 161 ("The Taylor Law reflects the Legislature's attempt to delicately balance the rights of public employees against those of their employers."); Burke & Thomas, Inc.
v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d at 772, 600 P.2d 1282 at 1288-89
(en bane). See also Comment, supra note 75, at 275-76, 302.
54. See text accompanying notes 83-108 i'!fra.
55. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) ("One undoubted
attribute of State sovereignty is the State's power to determine the wages which shall be paid to
those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions. • • .").
56. Edwards, Tlte .Developing Labor Relations Law in tlte Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv.
351! 361 (1972).
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lie employees owe extraordinary loyalty to the government,57 have
given way to a more sophisticated justification for the strike ban.
Supporters of the ban now point to political and economic realities
that they claim require a flat prohibition of strikes. Specifically, they
argue that the short-term perspective of government managers leads
them to cave in to demands that unions back up by refusing to provide essential public services.58 Because employment-related decisions in the public sector invariably have budgetary implications that
require political resolution, this view maintains that perversion of
the political process will occur if public employers cannot count on
an effective strike bat)..s9
Critics assail this view on three fronts. First, they question
whether public services are in fact uniquely essential.60 Second, they
contend that without the ability to strike, collective bargaining
amounts to no more than collective begging. 61 Finally, they note
that these clauses often have proved ineffectual. 62 A law likely to be
breached by thousands of decent citizens, critics argue, erodes general respect for the law, whether or not the public employer imposes
sanctions after an illegal strike.63 Although each of these criticisms
57. Both theories are explicated clearly in Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public
Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 549, 554-56 (1966).
58. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 13-15 (1971);
Summers, Public Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially .Diminishes .Democracy, 1 GOVT.
UNION REV. 5, 22 (1980); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 808 (1970).
59. Chief Judge Fuld states this position unequivocally:
Quite obviously, the ability of the Legislature to establish priorities among government
services would be destroyed if public employees could, with impunity, engage in strikes
which deprive the public of essential services. The striking employees, by paralyzing a
city through the exercise of naked power, could obtain gains wholly disproportionate to
the services rendered by them and at the expense of the public and other public employees. The consequence would be the destruction of democratic legislative processes because
budgeting and the establishment of priorities would no longer result from the free choice
of the electorate's representatives but from the coercive effect of paralyzing strikes of public employees.
City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 183, 243 N.E.2d 128, 132,295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 906
(1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969).
Proponents of t)iese views admit to the overgeneralizations involved. See THE UNIONS
AND THE CITIES, supra note 78, at 30.
60. See, e.g., Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences ofStrikes by Public Employees,
79 YALE LJ. 418, 418 (1970); Edwards, supra note 56, at 360, 362-63.
61. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 49, at 934; Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB, L.J. 548, 549 (1957); Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AND BARGAINING (1968) at 29 29 (H. Anderson ed. 1968): Wolk,
Public Employee Strikes-A Survey ofthe Condon-Wad/in Acts, 13 N.Y. L.F. 69, 69-70 (1967).
62. See note 2 supra.
63. "There is enough data to suggest that, in the public sector, there may be a de facto right
to strike, despite the legal strike ban in force." Edwards, supra note 52, at 892 (citing "at least
70 teacher strikes in the fall of 1972."). See St. Antoine, Public Employee Unions and the Law,
QUAD. NOTES, Fall 1970, at 9, 12.
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merits close scrutiny, they do not, even collectively, warrant interring
no-strike provisions.
The argument that public employees do not provide uniquely essential services seeks to undercut the central premise of those who
argue that the nature of public services enables public unions to
wield almost unlimited power when they threaten to strike. Obviously, not all public employees provide crucial services64 and many
private sector workers provide goods and services as important as
those provided by the public sector.65 But this misses the point: It is
the vulnerability of public services that truly distinguishes them from
most services provided by the private sector. 66 No readily available
private sector capability can fill the void created by public employee
strikes. Because the most vital public services - education and police and fire protection - are rendered without any user charge, 67
the private sector cannot offer more than a margin of competition. 68
Such market services as do exist - for example, private education
and security services - cater to a limited and generally well-to-do
clientele.
When illegal strikes disrupt public services, therefore, alternatives available in the private market will rarely suffice. Furthermore,
the certain resumption of public services deters market entry during
the strike. Thus, although fuel oil may be as essential to citizens as
fire protection, a strike at one refinery does not cripple the entire
market.69 At worst, prices rise to reflect reduced supply and the costs
of diverting goods from other markets.70 But vital public services
cannot be diverted readily, if at all, from other markets. Education
64. See, e.g., Burton & Krider, supra note 60, at 426; Edwards, supra note 56, at 362; Note,
supra note 57, at 557 ("Many strikes in the private sector are far more serious than strikes in
certain parts of the public sector. Nevertheless, all strikes are permitted in the former and
almost none are permitted in the latter.") (footnotes omitted).
65.. See note 64 supra. To take a glaring example, most doctors work in the private sector
and most librarians in the public sector.
66. See THE UNIONS AND THE CmES, supra note 58, at 194 ([T]here [is] . . . virtually no
fear of entry by a nonunion rival. . . ."); Armor, The Right to Strike: Some Basic, but Neglected, Questions, 2 GOVT. UNION R.Ev., Summer 1981, at 3, II ("But the critical difference is
that governments are, by definition, monopolies. Neither they nor their unions are affected by
the economic flywheel that usually holds private unions and companies within the bounds of
reality.").
67. The most important municipal services - police and fire protection - are "public
goods," i.e., they would be "purchased" in insufficient quantities if provided by the private
sector. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 454-58 (1976).
68. See Armor, supra note 66, at 11.
69. When private strikes threaten utterly to preclude the availability of important products,
the law provides for emergency procedures to terminate the strike. "[T]here is no such thing as
an unlimited right to strike in private employment. The Congress, state legislatures, and the
courts have for many years prescribed limitations on the right to strike . . . ." Anderson, supra
note 51, at 948. See 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1976); United Steelworkers of America v. United
States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
70. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 403-05 _(9th ed. 1973).
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and police and fire protection amount to geographically limited natural monopolies satisfying an inelastic demand that the private market simply cannot satisfy over the short-run of a public employee
strike.71
Just as the differences between private and public sector services
necessitate the strike ban to avoid the unacceptably high price that
strikes by public employees exact in the absence of market alternatives, differences between the private and public sector bargaining
contexts suggest that the strike ban has not eviscerated collective bargaining. The sensitivity of public sector management to the disruption of essential services allows unions to exercise a powerful noneconomic influence unavailable to workers in the private sector.72
Public managers may have every incentive to satisfy union demands
first out of available funds, 73 and the costs of current contract concessions often remain invisible, concealed in the fiscal catacombs of
large municipal budgets until well into the future. 74
Public sector unions also enjoy political influence that tends to
offset their inability to strike legally. Public employee unions have
demonstrated that they can muster the manpower, financing, and
discipline to utilize fully whatever political advantages they may
possess over private sector unions. 75 Whether this potential political
influence yields bargaining leverage equal to that enjoyed by private
employees who possess the right to strike defies certain determination. But when combined with the formal elements of statutory collective bargaining - the employer's duty to bargain in good faith
and impasse procedures that include fact-finding, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration76 - this unique advantage of public sector unions tends to offset the loss of the strike weapon. The policies
underlying legislative decisions to retain the strike ban thus fully
comport with both common sense and democratic theory.77
The argument that frequent violation justifies elimination of no71. See THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, supra note 58, at 194.
72. See THE UNIONS AND THE CmES, supra note 58, at 160-70; Comment, supra note 49,
at 273-74.
73. THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, supra note 58, at 195.
74. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the larger cities, unlike private
industry, must deal with several different bargaining units whose contracts expire at different
times.
75. See note 72 supra.
76. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 953-54 (''These statutes, all of which prohibit public
employees from striking, are based on the conviction that the political process can be substituted for the strike weapon as an orderly method of dispute resolution. • . . The theory behind these laws is that fact finders or arbitrators who are empoy.rered to make
recommendations, advisory awards, or final and binding determinations will be able to provide an effective political substitute for the strike.") (emphasis in original); Comment, supra
note 49, at 275-88.
77. See, e.g., note 59 supra.
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strike clauses applies to any statutory prohibition. The legislature
enacts every statutory norm with the knowledge that it will be violated, but this does not strip legislation of its force. 78 If anything, the
failure of a legal norm to command obedience suggests the need for
more effective, if not necessarily more severe, enforcement procedures. 79 Finally, this argument can be challenged forcefully on the
facts: The vast majority of public employee contracts emerge from
collective bargaining negotiations in which strikes play no role. 80
B.

The Impact of Private .Damage Actions

This review of the policies animating public employee statutes
that embody both the right to collective bargaining and a prohibition
against strikes will not convince committed opponents of either the
strike ban or the unionization of public employees that their respective policy preferences can be reconciled within the framework of
these statutes as they are currently written. But unlike the partisans
on both sides of this debate, courts cannot avoid the difficult task of
balancing the conflicting policies implicated in public employee statutes. They must instead consider whether to allow private damage
actions in light of the policies against strikes by, and in favor of collective bargaining for, public employees.
l. The Impact

of .Damage Actions on the Policy Against Strikes

Damage actions impose a cost on public employee unions for illegal strikes. Everything else being equal, this cost will tend to discourage unions from striking and thus further the policy against
illegal strikes. 81 And this deterrence is likely to operate more effectively than sanctions spelled out under a statute because of the large
number of potential plaintiffs.
The deterrent effect of private damage actions will be most apparent in cases where public employers forgo their statutory remedies. 82 If the public employer holds the bargaining advantage 78. See J. Andenaes, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 12-13 (1974) ("[L]egislators probably realize that many will break the rules but reason that many will observe them, so that
something, at least, will be gained.").
79. See Armor, supra note 66, at 9-10.
80. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 947. Cole, supra note 2, at 316, identifies 413 public
employee strikes for the latest year of available statistics; obviously, this represents only a tiny
fraction of the number of collective bargaining agreements reached by governmental employers and employees during this period.
81. Armor, supra note 66, at 9-10; Note, Private .Damage Actions Against Public Sector Unions for Illegal Strikes, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 1309, 1319 (1978) (hereinafter cited as "Harvard
Note").
82. See Armor, supra note 66, at 8-10; Kheel, supra note 49, at 933:
(Describing the 1966 New York transit strike: Not only had the law failed to stop the
strike, but it threatened to produce a second work stoppage because of the penalty provisions. The enforcement of these provisions would have denied the transit workers the
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because the employees in question perform less than critical services
or can be easily replaced83 - injunctive relief will ordinarily be
sought, and the union will be unable to rely on negotiated amnesty.
If the union complies with the injunction, the strike will end quickly
with little resulting damage. If the union defies the injunction, civil
contempt fines will quickly exhaust its resources. 84 Neither scenario
offers private litigants much incentive to sue.
By contrast, if a powerful union can force a public employer to
forgo statutory and equitable remedies, private damage actions may
function as an important equalizer. 85 Private actions are likely to
arise only when public unions expect to nullify the employer's enforcement of the statute and succeed in doing so. Private citizens are
unlikely to risk the expense and uncertainty of litigation if a struggle
in bankruptcy court for scraps of the union's financial remains constitutes the sole reward. But where economic or political realities
frustrate the intended operation of the strike ban, private damage
actions can have the salutary effect of significantly deterring illegal
strikes. 86
Courts and commentators have argued, however, that private actions will tend to prolong those strikes that do occur because unions
higher wages and other benefits negotiated under the mayor's auspices. As a result, the
governor and the legislature concluded that there was no alternative but to waive the
penalties despite the clear violations of the statue [sic));
Comment, supra note 49, at 269-70
([W)hen enforcement is at the discretion of the employer, sanctions are rarely invoked,
because employees dismissed on account of strike activity may be hard to replace. Moreover, when union organization is strong, a public employer is not likely to dismiss striking
employees, because such measures would probably only exacerbate an already delicate
situation. Manadatory sanctions have been only slightly more successful, because the
same considerations which prevent management from invoking discretionary sanctions
also encourage it to evade required sanctions whenever possible.)
(footnotes omitted); Note, supra note 57 at 553-54
(The principal concern of a public administrator whose employees are on strike is to get
the services operating again with the shortest possible delay. Since the most expedient way
to accomplish this is to induce the employees to go back on the job, the administrator is
not likely to invoke strict penal provisions which stand in the way of a settlement. Moreover, in many cases it is physically impossible to resume services unless the striking employees are rehired.)
(footnotes omitted.).
83. See Burton & Krider, supra note 60, at 432-35.
84. PATCO's plight offers an example. See Litigation Involving PATCO Is Still Up in the
Air, NATL. L.J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 8, quoting a union lawyer to the effect that "[PATCO]
stopped counting" the contempt fines "after the first 4.5 million . . . ." dollars. The summary
of PATCO litigation, not surprisingly, disclosed no private actions.
8~. Armor, supra note 66, at 9:
In any jurisdiction whose no-strike law is solely enforceable by public authorities, the
practical validity of the law is in inverse relation to the power of the union involved. If
the union has sufficient power to prevail on its major employment issues, it also probably
has the power to negate the law. . . .
. . . . The only method that can make a no-strike law mean what it says, regardless of
the incumbent in City Hall, the State House, or the White House, is private enforcement
of the law.
86. See notes 83-85, supra.
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will add indemnification agreements to their list of demands. 87 Two
factors suggest that these fears may be misplaced. First, the financial
constraints on local governments 88 will often mean that indemnification agreements can only be granted at the expense of other union
demands. 89 The union's prestrike perception of the cost of an illegal
strike will thus remain the same - an indemnification agreement
will cost the union wages and benefits that it would have otherwise
received. Second, the common law of duress, 90 judicial reluctance to
enforce agreements violative of public policy,91 and the general rule
against indemnification for punitive damages, 92 render the enforcement of such agreements problematic at best. And any possibility
that unions might prolong strikes to secure indemnification must be
discounted by the probability that private actions will entirely prevent many strikes.
2.

The Impact of Private Actions on the Policy Favoring
Collective Bargaining

To the extent that private actions further the policies of the strike
ban, they necessarily change the balance of bargaining strength between labor and management. The Supreme Courts of Michigan93
and Washington94 have held that this modification of the balance of
bargaining strength contravenes the policy in favor of collective bargaining.95 The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that:
[T]he delicate balance of labor relations is now primarily the province
of the legislature, and ... the schemes created by statute for collective
87. See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash.
2d at 775, 600 P.2d at 1290; Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1319-20.
88. Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 919, 924 (1969) ("The financial constraints on local governments constitute the most
serious problem they face in coping with public employee collective bargainings"). Even if the
ultimate resource constraint is very high, so long as a constraint exists at some level all allocations to indemnification come at the expense of other union priorities.
89. Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1319 n.50.
90. J. CALAMARI & J. P.ERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 262 (2d ed. 1973) ("[T]oday the
general rule is that any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.") (footnotes omitted).
91. Compare City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898,534 P.2d 403, 120
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975) (contract arrived at under pressure of illegal strike valid against complaint of third-party private citizen), with Grasko v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 31 Cal.
App. 3d 290, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973) (contract entered into under pressure of illegal strike is
void because public policy disfavors contracts for illegal consideration).
92. On the problematic nature of insurance against punitive damages, see W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS§ 2, at 12-13 (4th ed. 1971).
93. Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at
830-31.
94. Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d
762, 600 P.2d 1282.
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-216 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-.960
(1981).
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bargaining and dispute resolution must be allowed to function as intended, without the added coercive power of the courts being thrown
into the balance on one side or the other.96
Two assumptions lurk beneath this conclusion. The first is that the
legislature intended that strikes play a role in determining the balance of bargaining power between governments and public employees.97 Private actions, therefore, are objectionable because they deter
strikes and modify the bargaining balance. The second assumption is
that private actions operate uniformly, in all bargaining situations, to
create an identical perception of increased costs to unions contemplating illegal strikes. Neither assumption can withstand serious
scrutiny.
The very existence of the statutory strike ban suggests that the
legislature did not intend that the strike threat influence the balance
of bargaining strength. The imperative wording of these provisions,
and the criminal sanctions often imposed for their violation,
strengthens this impression.98 It seems anomalous to conclude that
the legislature tacitly approved of, and desired to insulate from liability, conduct it found fit to outlaw.99 And although it is dangerous
to infer legislative intent from inaction, 100 the retention of the strike
ban in most jurisdictions suggests that the proscription is intended to
be more than hortatory in its operation. At a minimum, the logic
that would lead to rejecting nonfrivolous private actions for strikeinflicted damages because the defendants have long engaged in the
illegal conduct that gives rise to the claim is questionable.
One could object, however, that the legislature knew that unions
would occasionally violate the strike ban. 101 Thus, the possibility remains that in establishing statutory penalties for violation of the
strike ban the legislature merely aimed to define the cost of an illegal
96. 92 Wash. 2d at 772, 600 P.2d at 1288.
97. Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1320.
98. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.202 (1979) ("No person holding a position [governed by this act] . . . shall strike."); N.Y. C1v. SERV. LAW§ 210.1 (McKinney) (1973) ("No
public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no public employee or
employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a strike."); WASH. REv.
CODE§ 41.56.120 (1981) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall permit or grant any public
employee the right to strike or refuse to perform his official duties.").
99. See Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (1973)
("Read the way defendants suggest, the Taylor Law would become an impenetrable shield of
immunity for public employees who may illegally cause serious damage to persons or parties
other than their employer.").
100. See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 1381-401 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
101. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 946-47 (The short history of unionism in the public
sector demonstrates graphically that merely declaring public employee strikes illegal will prevent neither collective bargaining from developing nor strikes from occurring."); Edwards,
supra note 52, at 892 (1973) (''The threat or exercise of this de facto right to strike appears to
be no less effective than the legalized right enjoyed by employees in the private sector.").
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strike. This view conceives the strike ban as a legislatively imposed
handicap that renders the strike option more expensive - but not
beyond the pale - so as to achieve a definite balance between management and labor. 102 If valid, this view would harmonize the fear
that an unfettered right to strike concedes public unions excessive
political power with the suspicion that collective bargaining without
the right to strike is a contradiction in terms.
Unfortunately, the elegance of this argument falls before both the
language and remedies of public employee statutes. These statutes
do not provide that unions may strike as long as they are willing to
pay a fee. Strike bans remain imperative; 103 it is, therefore, difficult
to view the strike ban as a sort of tax that allows public employee
strikes, but only under circumstances less favorable than those enjoyed by employees in the private sector.
A more direct response to the strike ban as tax argument would
rely on the nature of the penalties associated with violations of nostrike provisions. These provisions universally give public employers the right to equitable relief. 104 If the courts grant an injunction,
and the union defies it, the magnitude of potential fines is unlimited.
For this reason, it cannot be persuasively argued that the statutory
remedy constitutes a delicate legislative balance in the nature of a
tax. Private actions cannot upset the legislature's desired balance of
bargaining strength in cases involving injunctions because the legislature does not fix the fine that accrues for defiance of an
injunction. 105
The second assumption essential to the conclusion that private
actions will disrupt a legislatively established balance fares no better
than the first. The assumption that private actions will operate in all
circumstances to impose potentially catastrophic losses on unions
and thereby alter the balance of bargaining power ignores the fact
that private litigants will rarely sue when the public employer
secures injunctive relief. 106 Private litigants have a significant incentive to sue only when a powerful union emerges from an illegal strike
with its resources shielded because the public employer has agreed to
forgo statutory remedies. 107 Even if one grants the Washington
102. See Edwards, supra note 52, at 892. This view also pervades Lamphere Schools and
Burke & Thomas.
103. See note 98 supra.
104. See note 3 supra.
105. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162,350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176-77 (App. Div.
1973) ("[T]here is no limit on the amount the employee may be fined and there is no limit on
the period that the union may be deprived of its 'dues check-off.' Since the Legislature apparently found that fiscal constraints were appropriate to punish union transgressions, it does not
seem that the form, whether fines or damages, is a controlling distinction.").
106. See notes 83-84 supra.
107. See note 82 supra.
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court's assumption that the legislature 'intended to establish a de
facto balance of bargaining strength by avoiding draconian no-strike
sanctions, it seems unreasonable to assume further that the legislature intended that this balance shift in direct proportion to an illegally striking union's ability to negotiate amnesty. Rather than
distorting the bargaining balance ostensibly sought by the legislature, private actions may actually further the legislature's collective
bargaining policies by ensuring some sanction against illegal strikes
when political or economic realities vitiate statutory remedies. 108
3. The Impact of Private Actions on Judicial Administration

The final policy consideration that has concerned courts evaluating the propriety of private actions concerns judicial capacity to resolve the many private actions that might arise out of an illegal
strike. 109 This apprehension of "a labor law logjam in the courts" 110
should not deter the courts from considering such actions solely on
their merits. The limited number of illegal strikes likely to lead to
private actions, 111 and the possibility of consolidation, diminish the
likelihood that courts will find these actions administratively burdensome. The history of the "logjam" argument suggests that few
apologies for the status quo have been offered so often to avoid necessary reforms for so little reason. 112 Since the apprehended tidal
wave has yet to descend on jurisdictions that have recognized private
actions, courts should not hesitate to dispense justice on the merits
until such time as the burden of doing so exceeds the benefits.
108. This points up an important distinction betwi:en actions by public employers and actions by private citizens. Employer actions of the sort presented to the court in Lamphere
Schools depend on the prior balance of bargaining advantage. If the employer holds that
advantage, the existing imbalance is aggravated by the addition of the damage action to the
arsenal of management. By contrast, if the union can coerce management into not exercising
its statutory or equitable remedies, it can also coerce management into forgoing the damage
remedy. See Comment, supra note 49, at 293. In sharp contrast, a private damage remedy will
only be invoked against a union with the bargaining advantage, since contempt fines would
bankrupt the union if a speedy return to work did not render damages minimal. Consequently,
private damage actions tend to serve the interest in balanced bargaining, operating counter to
employer damage actions of the sort rejected in Lamphere Schools. This suggests that the
reliance on Lamphere Schools in Burke & 'Inomas, which involved a private litigant's action,
was misplaced.
109. Lamphere, 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at 830. The court also refers to this possibility as a "Pandora's box," 400 Mich. at 131, 252 N.W.2d at 831, predicting that "[v]arious
public employers and public employees, as well as unions would take turns suing each other
for tortious damages ad nauseum." 400 Mich. at 114 n.4, 252 N.W.2d at 823 n.4.
110. 400 Mich. at 131,252 N.W.2d at 830.
111. See Cole, supra note 2, at 316.
112. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 153 Eng. Rep. 402,404 (1842) ("We ought not to
permit a doubt to rest upon this subject for our doing so might be the means ofletting in upon
us an infinity of actions."). The citadel has fallen, but the sky has not.
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THEORIES OF RECOVERY

If, as this Note argues, neither the legislature's language nor the
policy judgment underlying public employee statutes precludes private actions, courts should adjudicate such actions on the merits.
Because courts have rejected causes of action implied from the statutory strike ban 113 and third-party contract.claims, 114 plaintiffs would
be well advised to pursue other theories for imposing liability on
illegally striking unions for strike-inflicted injury to private
parties. 115
A. Nuisance

A public nuisance is defined as an "unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public." 116 The interests protected under the nuisance rubric include public safety, health, and
unobstructed travel over public rights of way. 117 These categories
I 13. State courts have widely adopted the doctrine of causes of action "implied" from
statutes. See, e.g., Falmouth Hosp. v. Lopes, 376 Mass. 580, 382 N.E.2d 1042, 1045-46 (1978);
Manfredonia v. American Airlines, Inc., 68 A.D.2d 131, 139-40, 416 N.Y.S.2d, 291-92 (1979);
Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 724-25, 588 P.2d ll05, ll 16 (1978) (Linde, J. dissenting);
Gamm & Eisberg, The Implied Rights JJoctrine, 41 UMKC L. REV. 292, 294-95 & nn.7-12
(1972). No court, however, has yet upheld a cause of action based on implication from a
statutory strike ban. See Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fedn. of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104,
128-29, 252 N.W.2d 818,829 (1977); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 301,273 N.Y.S.2d
348 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92
Wash. 2d 762, 770-77, 600 P.2d 1282, 1287-90 (1979) (en bane).
There are several possible explanations for the failure of the implication theory. First, the
universal co=on-law illegality of public employee strikes suggest that the purpose of the
statutory strike bans was not to create the duty not to strike, but rather to define new methods
of ensuring compliance with the duty that already existed. This in turn suggests that if the
legislature chose not to include a damage remedy, it meant to imply none. Second, the public
purpose of the strike ban statutes runs counter to the "special benefit" of the plaintiff's class
test set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Third, recent
Supreme Court decisions have significantly narrowed the implication doctrine. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).
While some hope may linger for the implication theory, see Harvard Note, supra note 81,
at 1312-20, these developments suggest that alternative theories may offer better chances to
prospective plaintiffs.
114. Third-party contract claims have been rejected for lack of the parties' manifest intent
to benefit plaintiffs. See Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458,
475-76, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895, 908 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Jamur Prod. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501,
507, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353-54 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
115. This is not to say, however, that the previously rejected theories are unsupported by
reasonable arguments. See Harvard Note, supra note 81, at 1312-20, 1321-27.
ll6. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821B(l) (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971). This broad
definition fairly exemplifies the standard applied by the courts. See, e.g., Potomac River Assn.
v. Lundenberg Maryland Seamanship School, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 344, 358 (D. Md. 1975);
Ozark Poultry Prods. v. Garman, 251 Ark. 389, 390-91, 472 S.W.2d 714, 716 (1971); Robie v.
Lillis, 112 N.H. 492, 495, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (1972). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 92,
§ 88.
117. Offenses against these interests were originally viewed as co=on law crimes, and
nuisance would not lie unless the criminal law also proscribed the alleged nuisance. Every
American state has long since adopted an omnibus penal nuisance statute, however, and
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dovetail nicely with the interests jeopardized by the interruption of
public services. Additionally, because it does not generally matter
how the interferences with such interests arose, 118 nuisance offers a
plausible theory for imposing liability on illegally striking public
unions.
Perhaps more importantly, public sector strikes imperil public
rights to a greater extent than do classic nuisances. The risk posed
by a firefighters' strike far outstrips the risk posed by the fire hazards
of garbage dumps and old buildings - both well established public
nuisances. 119 Similarly, striking transit workers frustrate public
travel to an extent that the classic prupesture never could. 120 And
strikes by sanitation workers affect public health and comfort far
more than does a property owner who fails to dispose properly of
garbage or maintain the integrity of a cesspool, failures that constitute public nuisances at common law.12 1
Although an interference with public rights will not constitute a
nuisance if it amounts to a reasonable intrusion on the public interest, 122 the argument that illegal strikes properly fall within this exception lacks merit. The well-established policies underlying both
statutory and common-law strike bans 123 foreclose public unions
"[s]uch statutes are co=only construed to include anything which would have been a public
nuisance at co=on law." W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 88, at 596. Statutory considerations
consequently do not alter the analysis presented here in co=on-law terms. See, e.g., Duncan
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 257 Ala. 574, 577-78, 60 So. 2d 438, 440 (1952); City of Chicago v.
Geraci, 30 Ill. App. 3d 699, 702, 332 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1975); Co=onwealth v. MacDonald,
464 Pa. 435, 453-56, 347 A.2d 290, 300-01 (1975).
The cases speak of the rights protected by nuisance, and the manner in which a nuisance
may arise, quite broadly. "[A) public nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do s_omething
that injuriously affects the safety, health, or morals of the public, or works some substantial
annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the public...•" Co=onwealth v. South Covington
& C. St. Ry., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918). Many courts have approved this
language. Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350,
355 (1971); Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 170, 193 P.2d 277,280 (1948) (en
bane); Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 503, 298 N.W. 649, 653 (1941); Copart
Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971, 394
. N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (1977).
118. Note the act or omission standard adopted by the cases set out in note 117, supra.
Prosser elucidates: Nuisance "is a field of tort liability, rather than a type of tortious conduct.
It has reference to the interest invaded, to the damage or harm inflicted, and not to any particular kind of act or omission which has led to the invasion." W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 87,
at 573.
119. See, e.g., People v. Oliver, 816 Cal. App. 2d 885, 195 P.2d 926 (1948); State ex rel.
Brown v. Armstrong, 206 Okla. 145,241 P.2d 959 (1952); City ofSpokanev. Carlson, 73 Wash.
2d 76, 436 P.2d 545 (1968) (en bane).
120. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954);
Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959); James v. Hayward, 79 Eng.
Rep. 761 (K.B. 1631).
121. See Kem v. Myll, 80 Mich. 525, 45 N.W. 587 (1890); Harrington v. Board of Aldermen, 20 R.I. 233, 38 A. l (1897); Trevett v. Prison Assn. of Va, 98 Va. 332, 36 S.E. 373 (1900).
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, §87 at 581.
123. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2).
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from asserting successfully that their interruption of vital services
serves the public interest. Precedent establishing that private labor
activity, conducted illegally, can constitute a public nuisance, 124 also
undercuts argument along these lines.
Public sector strikes thus manifest the necessary elements of a
common-law nuisance. And although the case law is sparse, no
court that has reached the merits of the claim has rejected a public
nuisance theory of liability as applied to a public employee strike. 125
The interests that have been recognized in the limited case law on
point include the interest in safety threatened by a firefighters'
strike, 126 the interest in health threatened by a sanitation workers'
strike, 127 and the interest in public convenience threatened by a
transit strike. 128 The breadth of the public nuisance theory and the
variety of specific nuisances successfully assailed in cases brought
against private defendants 129 suggests that future plaintiffs may well
succeed in adding to the list of interests enumerated above.
A potential difficulty facing private plaintiffs who pursue a nuisance theory involves the traditional requirement of "special damages" different in kind, and not merely in degree, from those suffered
by the public generally. 130 In the absence of such proof, only a designated public officer is entitled to seek redress for a purely public
124. Courts have held, both before and after the enactment of the National Labor Rela•
tions Act, that picketing, pursuant to a strike, that involves intimidation or violence may be a
public nuisance. See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 61 (1959) (per curiam)
(Harlan & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895): Sherry v. Perkins,
147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888); F.C. Church Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516,279 S.W. 232
(1926).
125. Plaintiffs did not plead nuisance in Lamphere Schools, or Burke & Thomas. In City
of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Dept. Store Union, 1979-80 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH)
37,157 (W. Va. 1980), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected any common law
liability for a peaceful public employee strike in an action where plaintiffs pleaded nuisance.
This result, however, depended not on any appraisal of the merits of the nuisance claim, but
instead flowed from the court's broader conclusion to exercise judicial restraint by "adopt[ing]
the view of the Michigan Supreme Court in Lamphere . ••." The fact that West Virginia has
no legislative enactment of any sort relating to public employee labor relations casts-doubt on
the soundness of the Fairmont court's reasoning.
126. Fulenwider v. Firefighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH)
~ 36,956 (Tenn. App. June 2, 1980).
127. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
128. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 472, 437
N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
129. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 88, at 583-84, notes the following examples culled from
the cases: hogpens, storing explosives, keeping diseased animals, a malarial pond, detonating
fireworks, keeping a vicious dog, practicing medicine without a license, brothels, speakeasies,
indecent exhibitions, bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, public profanity, noises, odors, smoke,
dust, vibrations, obstructions of highways and waterways, and disorderly crowds, among
others. Turning the community's children away from the schoolhouse and into the streets
seems an annoyance at least equivalent to some of these, although damages would be highly
speculative.
130. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821C(l); Prosser, Private Actionfar a Public
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 997 (1966).
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wrong. 131 The fact that "special" damages need not be unique132
may somewhat alleviate this difficulty. Where a sanitation strike injures the public interest in clean waterways, but raw sewage befouls
an individual's waterfront, 133 or where a firefighters' strike jeopardizes public safety generally, but an individual's home actually
burns, 134 it would not be difficult to make out a claim of "special"
damages.
In fact, at least one jurisdiction has taken a fairly expansive view
of what will satisfy the "special" damages requirement. 135 In Burns
Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, a lower court held that
plaintiffs may recover mere "pecuniary losses" as "special" damages.136 Burns involved a claim by business and professional employees that a New York transit strike hampered their ability to
carry on their business activities. The court articulated a distinction
between damages resulting from increased "out-of-pocket ·expenses
incurred merely to carry on their professional practices . . . in the
face of an illegal strike" and "lost profits" occasioned by the inconvenience of disrupted daily routines. 137 The latter were considered
damages suffered in common with the public at large, but the former
were deemed recoverable pecuniary losses.
.
Although the approach in Burns can be faulted in several particulars, 138 the sufficiency of pecuniary losses to satisfy the special damages requirement reflects the prevailing rule. 139 Courts should
probably retain enough of the special damages requirement to deny
recovery in cases where plaintiffs cannot demonstrate financial loss
convincingly. But losses definite enough to withstand rigorous challenge and large enough to justify the expense of litigation cannot
131. Prosser, supra note 130, at 1005-07.
132. Prosser, supra note 130, at 1008-09.
133. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
134. This is the Fulenwider situation. The general loss will express itself as an increase in
insurance premiums.
135. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer, 108 Misc. 2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
136. 108 Misc. 2d at 473-75.
137. 108 Misc. 2d at 475.
138. The court's comprehensive view of special damages may disserve the policies behind
the special damages requirement, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,§ 821C, Comment a
(''The reasons usually given for the rule are that it is essential to relieve the defendant of the
multiplicity of actions that might follow if everyone were free to sue for the common wrong;
and that any harm or interference shared by the public at large will normally be, if not entirely
theoretical or potential, at least minor, petty and trivial so far as the individual is concerned."),
dissipate on trivial claims the resources available for compensation, and produce the anomaly
whereby those able to afford alternative private services during the strike will recover their
"pecuniary losses," while those who cannot afford such substitutes, and thus suffer most from
the strike, will find their damages "common to the public at large" and not recoverable.
139. REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS,§ 821C, Comment h; Prosser, supra note 130, at
1009 ("It is only when the class becomes so large and general as to include all members of the
public who come in contact with the nuisance, that the private action will fail").
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easily be dismissed as trivial. To the extent that the "special" damages requirement might foreclose recovery in cases where several
plaintiffs suffer substantial injury, pecuniary or otherwise, the liberal
approach taken by the Burns court seems advisable.

B. Negligence
An articulable duty to the plaintiff, breached by a failure to observe due care, proximate cause, and actual damages, is the classic
litany of actionable negligence. 140 The hombook definition of negligent conduct is "conduct which falls below the standard established
by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." 141 One could argue that a public union is negligent when it
engages in an illegal strike when a reasonable man would foresee
unreasonable risks to the public, and the strike in fact inflicts damages such as those foreseen. 142
l. .Duty

The steadfast refusal of courts to recognize any duty - on the
part of either public employers or employees - to provide individual citizens with vital public services presents the chief difficulty confronting plaintiffs under a negligence theory. As a general
140. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 30, at 143. Contemporary tort theory and its
discontents play little role in the discussion to follow. Insofar as modem tort theory favors
locating liability with the least cost damage avoider (within parameters set by a visceral sense
of justice), it favors the causes of action advocated here. For while the municipal employer
can avoid the strike by acceding to union demands, the cost of damage avoidance then includes the cost of those demands. Beyond this, the intricate comparison of negligence and strict
liability as alternate regimes for de.fining tort liability seems premature in the public sector
strike context, as no court has yet held a union that illegally strikes against a public employer
liable in simple negligence. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); w. BLUM &
H. KAI.VEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965); R. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed.
1977); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law ofTorts: An Essayfar Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. Rev. 69 (1975); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tori Theory, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 537
(1972); Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). A recent critical review of
this work is Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem Tort Theory, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980).
141. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 87 at 581.
142. The prevailing approach views the risks of a defendant's conduct that a reasonable
man would foresee as de.fining the scope of duty and the limits of proximate cause. See, e.g.,
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966) ("Every person has a general
duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others •.•" and "(t)he degree of care to be
exercised must be commensurate with the danger or hazard connected with the activity.")
(citations omitted); Harper v. Epstein, 16 Ill. App. 3d 771, 772-73, 306 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1974)
("[A) person owes to all others the duty of exercising care to guard against injury which may
naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of this action.") (citations
omitted); Mang v. Eliassen, 153 Mont. 431, 437, 458 P.2d 777, 781 (1969) ("defendant owes a
duty with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably
dangerous, and hence negligent in the first instance."); Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. 248 N.Y.
339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (''The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed.").

May 1982)

Note -

Public Union Strikes

1297

proposition, substantial policy considerations support this refusal.
As applied to illegal strikes, however, it has the anomalous effect of
shielding unions from liability for concededly illegal conduct that
makes severe harm to some individuals a virtual certainty. Palsgrq/143 long ago established that the elements of negligence do not
exist in isolation and that courts cannot properly assess one element
without considering the others. 144 A frank appraisal of the motivation behind illegal strikes, their likely effect, and the injustice of denying recovery when the risks posed by public strikes devolve with
crushing force on individual plaintiffs argues for resolving the duty
question against unions that engage in illegal strikes.
The traditional approach is typified by a recent decision of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals, which rejected a negligence claim
against an illegally striking firefighter's union because it found no
duty running from the firefighters to the plaintiff. 145 The court relied
on two earlier decisions 146 holding that a city does not incur negligence liability for failing to provide fire protection or for injuries
resulting from the operation of its firetrucks. From these decisions,
the court apparently reasoned that because the state owes no duty to
provide services, unions cannot be liable for interruption of whatever
services the state chooses to provide. This line of reasoning equating illegal strikes with a passive failure to provide services that
citizens do not enjoy as a matter of right - mires the negligence
analysis in the tortuous distinctions that separate an undertaking
from a duty, misfeasance from nonfeasance, and the good samaritan
rule from the "limited duty'' to act affirmatively. 147
143. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
144. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1956). Under the prevailing
view
inquiry is made into why the particular act or omission complained of was negligent. This
will be because the offending conduct foreseeably involved unreasonably great risk of
harm to the interests of someone other than the actor. This view would limit the scope of
the duty accordingly: the obligation to refrain from that particular conduct is owed only
to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those
risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in
other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably
entails.
(Emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Id. at 1018.
145. Fulenwilder v. Firefighters (IAFF) Local 1784, 1979-81 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH)
~ 36,956, at 37,757 (Tenn. App. June 2, 1980) ("We know ofno duty imposed upon a firemen's
union to furnish adequate fire protection to an individualproperty owner and we have no inclination to now create such a duty.") (emphasis in original).
146. Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238, 54 S.W.2d 718 (1932); Irvine v. Chattanooga, 101
Tenn. 291, 47 S.W. 419 (1898).
147. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 314,323; Harvard Note, supra note
81, at 1323-26, and cases cited therein; see also Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500
(9th Cir. 1975); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). Such distinctions are not
simplified by the semantic fact that any action can be described in negative terms, such that
doing nothing amounts to the failure to do something, and doing something amounts to the
failure to do nothing.
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If one focuses on the strike-related conduct of public unions sued
in a private action, however, an illegal strike involves more than a
mere passive decision not to undertake the provision of public services. A strike demands substantial, concerted organizational effort to
succeed; a strike vote must be called, and the result must be communicated to the membership. When public unions strike, they do not
intend to terminate their employment - they seek only to interrupt
services long enough to secure their demands. To this end, unions
must continuously coordinate the conduct of the strike with their negotiating position. 148 This sort of behavior does not signal a passive
refusal to provide gratuitous services.
The duty question takes on a different appearance when viewed
from this perspective. The issue is not whether government owes
private citizens a duty to provide services, but whether public employee unions owe a duty not to interfere with the services that government chooses to provide. Courts have consistently upheld such a
duty in related contexts. A railroad company whose train severs a
firehose, 149 or delays firemen at a crossing 150 incurs negligence liability to a plaintiff whose building bums. When the railroad's employees had reason to know that they must exercise due care to avoid
interfering with fire protection, 151 "interference with the rights of the
public to fire protection violates a fundamental social duty and is a
common law tort." 152 Similarly, although it is generally held that
citizens enjoy no right to use public roads, 153 contractors or property
owners adjacent to the roadway owe a duty not to endanger passersby through negligent behavior. 154 Analogizing illegally striking
148. These distinctions suffice to differentiate antistrike regulations from constitutionally
impermissible involuntary servitude. Anderson, supra note 51, at 948-49 (1969) ("Moreover,
restrictions on concerted work stoppages do not raise an issue of involuntary servitude. The
courts have always interpreted the constitutional provisions on involuntary servitude as running to the individual; they have never found that these provisions extend so far as to create a
collective right to terminate employment." (citing Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926))).
149. Kahn v. Southern Ry., 202 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1953) (obstructing crossing); Delaware
& H.R.R. v. Felter, 98 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1938) (obstructing crossing); Little Rock Traction &
Elec. Co. v. McCaskill, 75 Ark. 133, 86 S.W. 997 (1905); Erickson v. Great N. Ry., 117 Minn.
348, 135 N.W. 1129 (1912); Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d
702 (1949) (delaying firefighters at crossing); Phenix Ins. Co. v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.R.,
122 A.D. 111, 106 N.Y.S. 696 (1907), qff'd., 196 N.Y. 554, 90 N.E. 1164 (1909).
150. See Louisville N.R.R. v. Duncan, 16 Ala. App. 520, 79 So. 513 (1918); Cottonwood
Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d at 706 (1949); Luedeke v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 120 Neb. 124,231 N.W. 695 (1930).
151. Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. at 1067, 225 S.W.2d at 706 (1949).
152. Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. at 1067, 225 S.W.2d at 705 (1949).
153. See, e.g., Sueppel v. Eads, 261 Iowa 923, 928, 156 N.W.2d Il5, II8 (1968) ("Permission to .pperate a motor vehicle upon the public highways is not embraced within the term
'civil rights' and is in the nature of a license or privilege.") (citation omitted); Agree v. Kansas
Highway Commn. Motor Vehicle Dept., 198 Kan. 173, 180, 422 P.2d 949, 955 (1967) ("It is
established law that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon public streets and highways is
not a natural right, but a privilege, subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest.").
154. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist. v. Reeves, 281 Ala. 67, 69, 199 So. 2d 78, 80
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public employees to private citizens who negligently interfere with
the delivery of vital services is more precise than equating them with
a sovereign who has no duty to provide services.
2. Failure To Observe .Due Care

In direct contrast to the duty question, the inquiry into whether
due care was observed presents an ordinary factual question. The
formula generally applied to test a defendant's conduct against the
due care standard requires that the utility of that conduct exceed its
risk. 155 The legislature's judgment, as expressed in public employee
statutes containing no-strike provisions, that the policy of collective
bargaining does not justify granting the strike weapon creates at least
a rebuttable presumption on the utility-risk issue. And if courts accord the contemporary justification for the strike ban any weight, 156
benefits to the union from an illegal strike are likely to be found
dwarfed by the risks that such strikes pose. Once courts recognize a
duty of due care to those endangered by the disruption of government services, the negligence of a public employee strike is a conclusion not easily avoided. 157
(1967) (''We are unimpressed with the appellant's argument to the effect that the Gas Company had no duty to maintain the road and that that responsibility rested with the State or the
municipal authorities. We have long been committed to the proposition that one using a public way for its own purposes, even with permission, must use due care to avoid injury to the
traveling public."); Haragan v. American Fedn. of Grain Millers, 445 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1969)
(union pickets on highway shoulder may constitute negligence); Best v. Fred Weber Constr.
Co., 525 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Moore v. Geiger, 6 Ohio App. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 607
(1966).
155. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
156. See notes 74-130 supra and accompanying text.
157. Two lines of precedent in the New York State courts reinforce this conclusion. In
Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973) and Burns Jackson Miller
Summit & Spitzer v. Linder, 108 Misc. 2d 458 (1981), prima facie tort actions for damages
resulting from illegal strikes were upheld. This doctrine makes "actionable an intentional
wrong that [does) not classify into any of the formal categories" of tort law. 108 Misc. 2d at
465. The doctrine is justified on the ground that "[p]rima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be
the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape," 108 Misc. 2d at 465,
quoting Holmes, J., in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). The sweeping terminology
employed by the .Burns court begs the question of what constitutes an "intentional wrong,"
especially when the analysis is, by hypothesis, divorced from the formal categories which define tort law. See W. PROSSER, supra note 92 at 4. ("[E]ven with allowance made for the
difficulty of wording it, the rules does not tell us what the law will recognize as 'harm' to
another, or as '.justification' for it."). But these cases do suggest that even when the negligence
analysis concerning utility of conduct and liability proceeds less formally, that analysis results
in finding illegal strikes tortious.
Of closer relevance to negligence, the court in People v. Vizzini, 78 Misc. 2d 1042, 359
N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1974), upheld the validity of indictments that charged leaders of a
firefighters' local that illegally struck with criminal reckless endangerment, pursuant to N.Y.
PENAL LAW§§ 120.20, 145.25 (McKinney 1975). lfa union's leaders incur criminal recklessness by conducting an illegal strike, courts should, a fortiori, find it possible to impose civil
liability for simple negligence. While Vizzini involved allegations that the defendants fraudulently reported the results of the union strike vote, the magnitude of the risk posed by a strike
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Causation

Because illegal strikes exert pressure on public management
through the medium of damage to the public 158 proximate cause
would not appear to present a difficult issue for plaintiffs able to establish cause-in-fact. Government employers, of course, do not operate for a profit and may even save money during a strike. 159 The
union enjoys bargaining leverage during a work stoppage precisely
because the immediate, primary, and foreseeable result of illegal
strikes is damage to the public.
Causation-in-fact may present a closer issue in many cases.
While a police strike may lead to a demonstrable and perhaps dramatic crime wave, any particular citizen victimized during the strike
may not be able to link the injury conclusively to the strike. 16° Fire
destroys many buildings even when the fire department actively
does not depend on the process of decislon that led the union to engage in it. Negligence is
conduct, not a state of mind. See W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 31 at 145; Terry, Negligence,
29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). Vizzini therefore stands for the proposition that certain public
employee strikes create risks that considerably exceed those sufficient to amount to civil
negligence.
158. The court in Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, SI Misc. 2d SOI, 509,273 N.Y.S.2d 348,355
(Sup. Ct. 1966) dismissed causes of action for nuisance and prima facie tort later upheld in
New York courts because the damages complained of were "too remote" to allow recovery.
The court cited United Mine Workers v. Osborne, 279 F.2d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960), as authority for this proposition. SJ Misc.2d at 507,273 N.Y.S.2d
at 354. Osborne involved a suit against a union for an illegal strike by a sales agent of the
employer. The court found that the economic losses to third parties imposed by a strike were
too remote to permit recovery.
This authority ignores the distinction, now recognized by the New York courts, between
public and private sector strikes. Private sector unions exert pressure on management during a
strike by shutting down production, thus reducing sales and, ultimately, profits. But a government employer does not operate for profit. The only way the public union's strike exerts pressure on the employer is by inflicting damage on the public. As the court observed in Caso v.
District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (1973): "The assumption in
Jamur that the risk of damage in the subway strike was unforeseeable should be rejected, since
it is the very inevitability of extensive damages which led to the prohibition of public strikes."
Because the union calculates its bargaining leverage in terms of its capacity to inflict damage
on the public - the strike having no other impact on the employer, typically - damage
caused in fact by public employee strikes will nearly always deserve classification as
"proximate."
159. Education furnishes an excellent example' of an expensive service provided without a
user charge to the public. The educational system does not expend its funds during the duration of the strike, and hence amasses a subsidy it would normally expend on education, The
pressure on the school board to settle therefore partakes of no financial concerns at all, but
exclusively of the political pressures brought to bear through the infliction of damage on the
public.
160. See Maidlow v. City of Toledo, 921 Govt. Empl. Rel. Rep. 18, 1981-83 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) ~ 37,321 (Ohio Court of Common Pleas (1981). Plaintiffs' decedent was a bus
driver killed during a robbery that occurred while the police were on strike. The City of
Toledo escaped liability as a result of sovereign immunity. The defendant unions also prevailed on motions to dismiss, but neither service report makes clear on what grounds. The fact
situtation, however, admirably points up the "cause in fact" problem that may arise in such
circumstances.
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seeks to prevent this result, and this diminishes the likelihood that
fire losses during a strike would not have occurred but for the strike.
Several considerations minimize these difficulties. First, in many
cases the causation question will not prove difficult. In one case, for
example, the court had no difficulty concluding that ''but for'' the
sanitation strike, plaintifrs beaches would not have been drenched
with sewage. 161 Second, in cases where the causation issue proves
more difficult, there is no reason to suppose that the trier of fact will
falter. American law typically requires both judge and jury to make
difficult causation judgments. 162 The final consideration that undercuts any objection to private actions premised on the difficulty of
cause-in-fact is the satisfactory resolution of far more difficult causation questions in other contexts. 163 An example is the innovative application of probability analysis to class-action damage awards. 164
Regardless of how troublesome cause-in-fact questions might be in
specific cases, litigants deserve at least an opportunity to present
their evidence to the trier of fact.
4. Damages

If private actions are allowed against public unions, the primary
issue will then be whether a union will have the resources necessary
to compensate all potential plaintiffs. A union, possibly impoverished by contempt fines, will rarely have assets that even approximate the size of potential damage awards. This imbalance may lead
to great difficulty in fairly compensating the entire plaintiff class because no individual is likely to receive more than a small fraction of
his actual damages.
This problem does,not justify refusing to recognize private actions. Each plaintiff slfould be free to decide whether the potential
recovery makes litigation worthwhile, either individually or as a
member of a class. Furthermore, privat~ litigation will rarely be initiated except against a union possessing significant resources. 165
And, as between tortfeasors and their victims, even partial compen161. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973).
162. Jurors often weigh the credibility of two witnesses with completely contradictory accounts, or assign fault in unwitnessed double fatality automobile accidents. Such judgments
are at least as ineluctable as the causation problems presented by damage actions premised
upon illegal strikes.
163. One example is the challenge posed by the introduction of epidemiological evidence.
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal Rptr. 132 (1980); Abel
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
164. Such an approach in a public union strike case would measure the difference in casualties attributable to the strike, and assign each casualty victim for the strike period damages
equal to her actual loss multiplied by the probability that but for the strike she would have
escaped injury. See note 163, supra.
165. See the policy analysis developed in note 107 and accompanying text.
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sation serves the fundamental policy of tort law. 166 Plaintiffs deserve
at least the option of pursuing partial compensation.
CONCLUSION

The absence of legislative intent to prohibit private remedies
through the enactment of public sector labor legislation suggests that
common-law tort principles should define the scope of union liability
for illegal strikes. Nuisance and negligence offer two possibilities for
defining such liability. In the judicious application of these familiar
principles, rather than in speculation concerning ineluctable legislative purposes, lies the proper role of courts adjudicating private damage actions against public sector unions for illegal strikes.

166. W. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 2, at 7 (the tort action's "purpose is to compensate him
[the victim] for the damage he has suffered at the expense of the wrongdoer."). Most victims
probably would prefer partial compensation to none at all. And the deterrent effect of private
actions, even if motivated by a lust for attorneys' fees, serves the public policies underlymg the
strike ban. See notes 81-92 supra.

